David S. Evans

Dr. 埃文斯是十大电子游艺平台首选的顾问委员会成员，总部设在波士顿. 他曾在美国的许多反垄断案件中担任作证专家, and other jurisdictions, including several landmark cases. He has made submissions to, and appearances before, 与合并有关的反垄断和监管机构, antitrust and related matters in the US, EU, China, and Korea among others. For more details see http://davidsevans.org.

His academic work focuses on industrial organization, including antitrust economics, 在平台业务和数字经济方面有特别的专长.  他写了六本主要的书，包括获奖的 Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Business，以及这些领域的100多篇文章和手册章节. The U.S. 最高法院广泛引用了他在多边平台和支付系统方面的工作 State of Ohio v. American Express.

Dr. Evans has taught courses related to antitrust economics, multisided platforms, and the digital economy, primarily for graduate students, officials, judges, and practitioners. From 2004-2022, 他是杰文斯竞争法和经济学研究所的联合执行主任, and Visiting Professor, University College London, where he taught courses on antitrust, multisided platforms, and the digital economy. 他还曾在芝加哥大学法学院和福特汉姆法学院教授反垄断经济学.

Dr. 埃文斯还从事反垄断以外的其他各种事务, many involving platform and digital businesses, intellectual property, financial markets, and payment systems.  In the US, across all matters, he has testified in federal and state courts, several arbitration panels, and Congress.

REPRESENTATIVE MATTERS
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• Epic Games v. Apple. Epic Games市场定义首席证明经济专家, monopoly power, 以及与苹果在应用分发和支付方式方面的行为有关的反竞争影响. 专家报告、证言、书面证言和审判证言.  Expert reports, deposition testimony, and trial testimony.

• T-Mobile acquisition of Sprint. On behalf of T-Mobile and Sprint, 向FCC提交了关于拟议合并对蜂窝数据价格和容量的动态影响的声明, the competitive investment of other carriers, and the likely value of 5G capacity.

• Apple v. Qualcomm. 代表高通公司的证词涉及受FRAND承诺约束的标准必要专利许可所引起的反垄断和知识产权问题. Expert reports and deposition testimony. 苹果和高通在审判开始时达成了和解协议.

• Federal Trade Commission v. 1-800 Contacts. 代表联邦贸易委员会就1-800 Contacts与其他在线隐形眼镜销售商之间限制某些搜索广告形式的协议的竞争影响作证. 关于搜索引擎和搜索广告经济学的专家报告和审判证词, market definition, and competitive effects.

• NACHA’s Interchange Fees for Same Day ACH System. On behalf of NACHA, 美国大多数银行的协会，为ACH系统制定规则, 向联邦储备委员会提交报告，并就在美国建立当日结算银行网络的经济情况作了介绍, and the role of interchange fees in doing so.

• Comcast’s Proposed Acquisition of Time Warner Cable. On behalf of Netflix, 向联邦通信委员会提交了多份反对合并的声明，并在联邦通信委员会和美国司法部露面.

• Qihoo 360 v. Tencent. 在最高人民法院支持腾讯的书面证词, People’s Republic of China, 就奇虎360对腾讯的市场定义和滥用主导地位的指控. 这是中国最高法院根据《亚洲十大信誉电子平台》作出的第一起反垄断案件.

• European Commission v. Microsoft. 在大法庭前的口头证词和书面陈述, 欧洲初审法院(现为欧洲普通法院)代表微软就欧洲委员会关于微软滥用其在媒体播放器和服务器互操作性方面的主导地位的决定的经济方面提出申诉. Made several appearances, providing oral testimony concerning various topics, particularly with regard to abuse of dominance, over five days.

HONORS AND RANKINGS

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• 2017年公理商业图书奖经济学金奖得主 Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms (with R. Schmalensee).

• Winner of the Business, Management & 美国出版商协会颁发的2006年度专业/学术出版大奖会计类奖项, Inc. for 看不见的引擎:软件平台如何推动创新和产业转型(with R. Schmalensee).

• Top 2% of published economists, IDEAS/RePEC, based on quality-weighted citations (January 2022); ranked among top 20 economists, and top 20 law professors, on SSRN based on total downloads of papers (January 2022).

REPRESENTATIVE PUBLICATIONS

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• Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2016).  已出版或待翻译的中文、法文、日文、韩文、俄文、西班牙文、越南文. 2017年公理商业图书奖经济学金奖得主.

• 看不见的引擎:软件平台如何推动创新和产业转型, (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2006), with A. Hagiu and R. Schmalensee. Translated into Chinese and Korean. Winner of the Business, Management & 美国出版商协会颁发的2006年度专业/学术出版大奖会计类奖项, Inc.

• 用塑料支付:购买和借贷的数字革命
  (马萨诸塞州:麻省理工学院出版社，1999年第一版，2005年第二版)，R. Schmalensee. Translated into Chinese.

• 《亚洲十大信誉电子平台》(与R. Schmalensee), in Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, R. Blair and D. Sokol, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

• “网络平台之间的注意力竞争及其对反垄断分析的影响”， Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2013, 9(2), 313-357.

• “治理多边平台用户的不良行为，” Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2012, 27(2).

• 《十大电子游艺平台首选》 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2009, 23(3), 37-60.

• 微软判决及其对欧洲主导企业竞争政策的影响,” (with C. Ahlborn), Antitrust Law Journal, 2009, 75(3), 887.

• “设计评估单边行为的反垄断规则:新芝加哥方法”，(与A. Padilla), University of Chicago Law Review, 2005, 72(1), 73-98.

• Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? 来自竞争市场的证据及其对法律约束的启示，”(与M. Salinger), Yale Journal on Regulation, 2005, 22(1), 37-89.

• “The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets,” Yale Journal on Regulation, 2003, 20(2).

• “动态竞争行业中反垄断分析的经济层面”，(与R. Schmalensee), in Innovation Policy and the Economy, Vol. 2, A. Jaffe, J. Lerner and S. Stern, eds., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002.